"Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds."
In this 1896 essay, William James makes one of philosophy's most controversial claims: sometimes, we are justified in believing things without sufficient evidence. This is not an argument for irrationality, but a careful defense of faith in the face of uncertainty.
The Genuine Option
James introduces the concept of a "genuine option"—a choice between beliefs that is:
1. Living (both alternatives are real possibilities for the believer)
2. Forced (you cannot avoid choosing)
3. Momentous (the stakes are significant)
When faced with a genuine option that cannot be decided on intellectual grounds alone, James argues, we have the right—even the duty—to let our "passional nature" decide.
The Limits of Evidential Reasoning
James challenges the evidentialist position (famously articulated by W.K. Clifford) that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." He points out that this principle is itself not based on evidence, but on a particular value judgment: that avoiding error is more important than gaining truth.
But what if we value truth-seeking over error-avoidance? What if some truths can only be accessed by those willing to believe first?
Faith and Verification
James's most striking example concerns social relationships. If you doubt whether someone could be your friend, your skepticism itself prevents the friendship from forming. But if you have faith in the possibility, you create the conditions that verify your belief. The belief helps create its own verification.
This principle, James suggests, applies to religious faith as well. Some truths about the universe may only reveal themselves to those who approach with faith rather than skepticism.
The Risk of Belief
James does not advocate believing anything and everything. He acknowledges that believing without evidence involves risk. But he insists that refusing to believe also involves risk—the risk of missing out on important truths that require faith as a precondition for their discovery.
The question is not whether to take risks, but which risks to take.
Contemporary Implications
James's essay has profound implications for how we think about belief in an age of scientific rationalism. It suggests that the demand for evidence before belief may itself be a form of dogmatism—one that closes us off from certain kinds of knowledge.
In fields from quantum mechanics to social psychology, we are discovering that the observer affects the observed. James anticipated this insight: sometimes, believing makes it so.
Source: William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897)
Public Domain: Available via Project Gutenberg